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Climate Change and Mandatory Carbon Reporting:
Impacts on Business Process and Performance
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ABSTRACT
As part of their annual directors’ report, UK-listed companies are now required to disclose their
greenhouse gas emissions and account publicly for their contributions to climate change. This paper
uses this mandatory carbon reporting to explore wider debates about corporate social responsibility
and the purpose, practice, and impacts of such non-ﬁnancial reporting. Empirically, it combines doc-
umentary analysis of the carbon reporting practices of 176 large ﬁrms listed in the FTSE100 and/or
subject to the UK government’s adaptation reporting power with 60 interviews with stakeholders in-
volved in carbon reporting. Firms disclose their emissions in response to ﬁnancial incentives, social
pressure and/or regulatory compulsion. In turn, rationales shape whether and how carbon reporting
inﬂuences internal business processes and performance. The importance of reporting to the bottom
line varies by sector depending on two variables – energy intensity and economic regulator status –
yet there is limited evidence that carbon reporting is driving substantial reductions in emissions.
Findings suggest reasons for caution about hopes for ‘nudging’ ﬁrms to improve their environmental
performance and social responsibility through disclosure requirements. © 2017 The Authors. Business
Strategy and the Environment published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Introduction
LIKE OTHER FORMS OF NON-FINANCIAL BUSINESS REPORTING, CORPORATE CARBON REPORTING – THE DISCLOSURE OF GREENHOUSE GAS(GHG) emission accounts – has become increasingly common over the last decade (Knox-Hayes and Levy,2011; Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012; Varnäs et al., 2013). For instance, the number of ﬁrms reporting theiremissions to the Carbon Disclosure Project’s (CDP) voluntary climate reporting index grew ﬁvefold, from
221 respondents in 2003 to 1971 in 2014 (CDP, 2014). The CDP is far from the only reporting framework through
which businesses are now publicly accounting for their GHG emissions. Scholars and business analysts have of-
fered a number of competing explanations for this expansion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting
about carbon, ranging from rational pursuit of cost savings (Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Hoffman, 2007), brand
*Correspondence to: Samuel Tang, School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK.
E-mail: s.tang@qmul.ac.uk
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, pro-
vided the original work is properly cited.
© 2017 The Authors. Business Strategy and the Environment published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Business Strategy and the Environment
Bus. Strat. Env. 27, 437–455 (2018)
Published online 10 December 2017 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/bse.1985
differentiation (Delmas et al., 2006; Matisoff et al., 2013) or reputational gains (Hoffman, 2005) to coercive pres-
sures from regulators (Levy and Egan, 2003; Lyon and Maxwell, 2004; Jones and Levy, 2007), institutional investors
(Pfeifer and Sullivan, 2008; Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011; Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012; Cotter and Najah, 2012) or
environmental pressure groups (Stanny and Ely, 2008; Hahn et al., 2015) and mimetic pressures to follow the latest
corporate fashions in CSR (Sullivan, 2008; Ihlen, 2009).
Beyond this debate about the appeals of corporate carbon reporting and the reasons for its increasing volume and
frequency, there are also questions about whether and how the practice of publicly accounting for GHG emissions
inﬂuences organizational behaviour and the economic and environmental bottom line. Some scholars argue that
CSR practices such as carbon reporting not only minimize pollution and environmental harm, but also promote
proﬁtability, technological innovation, and wider economic competitiveness (Hajer, 1995; Mol et al., 2009). Such
ecological modernization promises to reconcile the imperatives of economic growth and proﬁt with environmental
protection, delivering win–win outcomes (Boiral et al., 2012; Gouldson and Sullivan, 2012).
In the hope that disclosure will incentivize business innovation and improved environmental performance, the UK
government recently became the ﬁrst jurisdiction in the world to require publicly listed ﬁrms to account for their green-
house gas emissions as part of their annual ﬁnancial reporting. Other jurisdictions, such as Norway, Singapore, and
Hong Kong, are now following the British lead in requiring companies to report on their GHG emissions. However,
as Jones and Levy (2007, p. 429) note, ‘the relentless upward trend in emissions presents something of a paradox’. Al-
though the proportion of ﬁrms engaged in carbon reporting has increased substantially over the last decade, the rate of
emission reductions made by UK ﬁrms has actually slowed. ‘Between 1990 and 2008, business sectors reduced GHG
emissions by 19% but just 4% of this reduction took place in the period 1999–2008’ (Haslam et al., 2014, p. 204), even
though ﬁrms devoted greater efforts to monitoring and reporting on their progress in reducing emissions.
Critical studies of CSR reporting have highlighted its purely performative qualities and raised doubts about its efﬁ-
cacy in altering organizational behaviour or improving sustainability and the bottom line (Bansal and Roth, 2000).
Other scholars dismiss carbon reporting – like CSR more generally (Greer and Bruno, 1996) – as calculated ‘green-
washing’ (Okereke, 2007; Lyon and Maxwell, 2011; Bowen, 2014): an entirely outward-facing activity designed to ‘gain
or extend legitimacy, tomaintain its level of current legitimacy, or to repair or to defend its lost or threatened legitimacy’
(O’Donovan, 2002, p. 349). In seeking to inﬂuence the perceptions of external stakeholders, companies are often selec-
tive about what they report, carefully manicuring their image by emphasizing short-term positive environmental per-
formance to draw attention away from worsening overall standards (Vos, 2009) or using environmental
performance to re-brand and downplay less ethical organizational practices and outcomes (Jahdi and Acikdilli, 2009).
Rather than calculated dissembling, others explain the tendency for CSR reporting to be de-coupled from organiza-
tional performance in terms of mimetic pressures for businesses to report simply for the sake of it rather than for any
other substantive goal that would be furthered by collecting and reporting GHG emission data (Shore and Wright,
1999; Power, 2003; Shore, 2008). From this perspective, ﬁrms report because they are expected to, and so their
reporting activity has little inﬂuence on organizational performance beyond demonstrating compliance with regulatory
reporting requirements, wider social norms and competitor behaviour. Observable organizational behaviour consistent
with this perspective would include ritualistic disclosure, adoption of a ‘tick-box attitude’, and employment of dedicated
environmental specialists trained in environmental science to give disclosure scientiﬁc credibility (Stubbs et al., 2013).
This paper uses the case of carbon reporting to address these wider questions about the purpose, practice, and
impacts of non-ﬁnancial reporting and thereby contribute to wider debates about CSR and disclosure requirements.
To date most of the research on carbon reporting has focused on the rationales for and impacts of voluntary disclo-
sures (Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015; Giannarakis et al., 2017), whereas our analysis also considers responses to
mandatory reporting, so as to speak to wider policy questions about the effectiveness of transparency requirements
in nudging ﬁrms to behave more sustainably (Escobar and Demeritt, 2017). After a brief description of our sample
frame and methodology, we present our ﬁndings in four main sections. First we describe the different carbon
reporting schemes and how ﬁrms from different sectors in our sample have responded to their requirements. Then
we discuss the various rationales for carbon reporting and identify several widely observable drivers for carbon dis-
closures. Third, we describe how carbon reporting has inﬂuenced internal business processes and organization, be-
fore assessing its impacts on emission reduction. A discussion section draws together ﬁndings to explain sectoral
variations in the rationales for and impacts of carbon reporting across the sample. The paper concludes by summa-
rizing its wider contributions to knowledge.
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Methodology
Drawing on the traditions of interpretative social science (Demeritt and Dyer, 2002), we combine extensive methods
of systematic documentary analysis with intensive methods of in-depth interviews to explore the rationales for and
impacts of carbon reporting by large corporations based in the UK. UK ﬁrms provide an ideal sample to explore
business responses to carbon reporting, because they were historically among the earliest and most proactive ﬁrms
at disclosing emission data voluntarily (CDP, 2013) and now face multiple obligations to report on their emissions
(Kauffmann et al., 2012), including a new mandatory carbon reporting (MCR) requirement that came into force in
October 2013. Furthermore, the diversity of the UK corporate sector offers comparative opportunities to explore the
relative inﬂuence of different drivers on reporting practice and business performance (Nyberg and Wright, 2012).
The ﬁrst extensive phase of research involved a systematic desktop review of annual company reports from the
112 ﬁrms listed among the FTSE 100 in the period 1 June 2013 to 30 September 2014 and thus subject to the
MCR, as well as 20 transportation infrastructure providers (classiﬁed as industrials) and 32 utilities, which, as crit-
ical infrastructure providers, were subject to adaptation reporting requirements under the Adaptation Reporting
Power exercised by the UK Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (Defra) under the Climate Change
Act 2008. As well as gathering an extensive corpus of discourse data about corporate responses to climate change,
the desktop review also gathered quantitative data about emissions from those ﬁrms making it publicly available in
their annual reports. Each ﬁrm was then ranked in terms of four ordinal levels of climate disclosure: from level 0 for
those ﬁrms not disclosing any information about their climate strategies and emissions, to level 3 for those provid-
ing detailed text and quantitative data (see Tang, 2016, for details of classiﬁcation methods).
Then, from this set of 168 ﬁrms, a second more intensive phase of interview research involved interviews with an
opportunistic sample of 19 ﬁrms from four case study industrial sectors: extractives, ﬁnancial services, energy utilities
and water utilities. These sectors were chosen because of their differing levels and forms of engagement with climate
change. Whereas the very visible impacts on climate change from oil, gas and mining operations have meant that the
extractives industry has long been proactive at both the sectoral and ﬁrm levels (Levy and Kolk, 2002; Ford et al., 2010;
Pellegrino and Lodhia, 2012), the ﬁnancial services industry has been slower to respond to climate change (Kolk and
Pinkse, 2004; Furrer et al., 2012). Among utilities, the literature suggests that engagement with climate change is con-
sistently higher, but whereas energy generation and distribution utilities have tended to emphasize mitigation
(Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010; Sprengel and Busch, 2010) water utilities have tended to be more concerned with
adaptation (Tang and Dessai, 2012; Gasbarro et al., 2014). Our purposeful sample of industrial sectors will enable us
to explore the inﬂuence of these sectoral factors on ﬁrm-level understandings of and responses to carbon reporting.
Contact was attempted with representatives of all the ﬁrms in our four target sectors, with all of those willing to
participate interviewed. In total, we completed 36 semi-structured interviews with individuals including executives
and specialists in climate change, sustainability, energy policy, supply chain, procurement, ﬁnance, health and
safety, and marketing, from 19 ﬁrms (Table 1), whose levels of climate information disclosure ranged from limited
Industrial sector
Company
A B C D E Total for sector
Extractives No. of interviews 2 2 1 4 1 10
Disclosure level 3 3 3 3 3
Financial services No. of interviews 2 1 1 1 1 6
Disclosure level 2 1 2 2 3
Energy utilities No. of interviews 4 3 2 1 10
Disclosure level 3 3 3 0
Water utilities No. of interviews 2 2 2 3 1 10
Disclosure level 3 3 3 3 3
Table 1. Number of interview participants and level of climate information disclosure by ﬁrm and industrial sector
See Tang (2016) for details of disclosure level.
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data and text (Level 1) to detailed data and text (Level 3) (see Tang, 2016). Where possible, interviews were conducted
with multiple individuals within participating ﬁrms to enhance validity through source triangulation (Yin, 2003). To
encourage honest and accurate responses and protect respondent conﬁdentiality, participating interviewees and
their organizations are only described in broadly non-identifying terms. Industry respondents were asked to reﬂect
on their role within the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm’s approach to environmental issues, the historical context of the ﬁrm’s engage-
ment with climate change, the ﬁrm’s current climate change responses, and its status as leader or laggard relative to
key competitors. In parallel with these case study interviews, we conducted a further set of 24 semi-structured in-
terviews with individuals representing either government (n = 10), regulators (n = 4), consultants (n = 4), or non-
proﬁt organizations (n = 6) involved in the design and practice of carbon reporting schemes. Each interview
lasted between 40 and 80 minutes and was recorded and fully transcribed, providing a rich and extensive source
of qualitative data, which was analytically triangulated against the ﬁndings from the initial desktop review.
With both the textual material from company reports and interview transcripts, the ﬁrst stage of data analysis in-
volved careful reading followed by an iterative process of ‘open coding’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Using NVivo, we
created nodes – combining segments of text reﬂecting similar wordings or activities – representing different ratio-
nales (e.g. measures emissions), practices (e.g. collect Scope 1 and 2 emissions), and impacts of reporting (e.g. en-
hanced energy efﬁciency). Emergent themes within these nodes and across the four case study sectors were then
coded. In the ﬁnal stage of data analysis axial coding was used to search for patterns and relationships within and
between nodes and case study sectors (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), including the relationship between companies’
level of disclosure, their climate strategy, and their status as sectoral leaders or laggards, which has been identiﬁed
as an important factor by some past research (Lee, 2012; Sprengel and Busch, 2010).
Carbon Reporting Schemes and Requirements
The last 20 years have seen the emergence of a wide variety of schemes for encouraging – and sometimes legally requir-
ing – companies tomeasure and report their GHG emissions. In 2009, Green (2010) counted some 25 voluntary GHG
reporting schemes worldwide, collecting and disseminating a variety of information about direct emissions by ﬁrms of
carbon dioxide and other GHGs (so-called Scope 1 emissions), as well as Scope 2 emissions arising indirectly as a con-
sequence of the energy that ﬁrms purchase and consume. Some voluntary schemes also collect data on Scope 3 emis-
sions, which include all other emissions indirectly attributable to ﬁrms as a result of the production of purchased
inputs, transportation on common carriers, out-sourced activities, and the processing and ultimate disposal of ﬁrm
products and waste.While international standards have emerged for accounting for these different kinds of GHG emis-
sion (Kolk et al., 2008; Milne and Grubnic, 2011), voluntary reporting frameworks often collect different kinds of infor-
mation, which they aggregate and disclose in different ways that can complicate comparison. The most prominent
voluntary scheme for reporting GHG emissions is probably the CDP, which was founded in 2003 to collect information
from participating ﬁrms on their climate-change-related risks and opportunities, GHG emissions and climate change
management systems and processes on behalf of its 800+ institutional investor signatories (Matisoff et al., 2013).
In addition to these voluntary schemes for disclosing GHG emissions, ﬁrms in many jurisdictions also face var-
ious mandatory requirements to report on their GHG emissions. In the UK, energy intensive ﬁrms participating in
the emission trading schemes (e.g. EU ETS) – run ﬁrst by the UK government and then the EU – have been re-
quired to report on their direct Scope 1 emissions since 2002, in addition to reporting on their energy consumption
as part of the Climate Change Levy, which was introduced in 2001. Similar reporting requirements were extended
in 2010 to large, but less energy intensive companies and public sector organizations through the UK government’s
Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC), which requires organizations to report the gas and electricity consumed by
their UK operations. In 2013 the UK government signiﬁcantly expanded the extent and reach of emission reporting
by introducing a mandatory carbon reporting requirement (MCR) on all UK incorporated and publicly listed com-
panies on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange.1 Applying to some 1100 listed companies, the MCR
1The MCR also applies to companies operating in the UK and listed in an EEA state, or admitted to trading on the New York Stock Exchange or
NASDAQ Stock Market (Crown, 2006).
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requires companies to account for their Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions as part of their annual (directors’) re-
port (Defra, 2014). In turn, Defra guidance on reporting methodology has encouraged other organizations not di-
rectly subject to the mandate to report voluntarily (Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015).
Of the 168 ﬁrms in our sample, 116 (69%) were subject to the MCR (Table 2), with all but six (5%) fully compliant
with its reporting requirements. In addition, a number of critical infrastructure providers not formally subject to the
MCR also complied with its reporting requirements voluntarily. Voluntary compliance was much higher among
utilities, with 19 of 32 (59%) not subject to the MCR still reporting Scope 1 and 2 emissions in their annual reports,
than among transportation infrastructure providers, where only a quarter (5 of 20) critical infrastructure providers
in the industrial sector exempt from the MCR complied with its reporting requirements voluntarily. Even before the
MCR came into force in 2013, more than two-thirds (71%) of ﬁrms in our sample were including the required emis-
sion data in their 2012 annual reports (Table 2), with the rate of voluntary compliance highest in the technology
(100%), ﬁnancials (91%) and basic materials (87%) sectors (Table 2). However, ﬁrms in these sectors were some-
what less likely to exceed its requirements by reporting on Scope 3 emissions than ﬁrms in the healthcare (50%),
ﬁnancials (43%) and consumer goods (42%) sectors (Table 2), where a larger proportion of ﬁrms chose to disclose
additional information about their emissions and climate strategies.
In the next section we draw on qualitative data from company reports and case study interviews to explore the
rationales for reporting and the reasons why particular ﬁrms and sectors may lead or lag competitors in their level
of climate disclosure.
Rationales for Carbon Reporting
We identiﬁed three broad rationales for carbon reporting. A ﬁrst rationale was ﬁnancial, which previous
studies have identiﬁed as a strong motive for environmental reporting (Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Hoffman,
2005; Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011). Emissions are inextricably linked to energy consumption, which can be
a major contributor to net corporate expenditure. As one energy intensive extractive industry representative
explained,
Most of our emissions are associated with fuel combustion. From our perspective there is a strong align-
ment between cost drivers and environmental goals, where every bit of fuel we burn costs us money. Our
facilities energy bill is massive because we use a lot of electricity and natural gas. If we can reduce our en-
ergy usage we can reduce our costs and emissions. Reporting helps to keep us updated (Extractive D, Inter-
view 4).
Industrial sector Firms in
sample
Reporting prior
to MCR
Subject
to MCR
Fully compliant
with MCR
Exceeding MCR
requirements
Oil & gas 5 4 (80%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 1 (20%)
Basic materials 15 13 (87%) 1 (7%) 14 (93%) 5 (33%)
Industrials 39 21 (54%) 19 (49%) 25 (64%) 4 (8%)
Consumer goods 12 10 (83%) 12 (100%) 11 (92%) 5 (42%)
Healthcare 6 3 (50%) 6 (100%) 5 (83%) 3 (50%)
Consumer service 22 18 (82%) 22 (100%) 21 (95%) 6 (27%)
Telecommunications 5 4 (80%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 2 (40%)
Utilities 37 21 (57%) 5 (14%) 18 (49%) 7 (8%)
Financials 23 21 (91%) 23 (100%) 21 (91%) 10 (43%)
Technology 4 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%)
TOTAL 168 119 (71%) 116 (69%) 129 (77%) 43 (26%)
Table 2. Greenhouse gas reporting by ﬁrm study sample
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This informant’s ﬁrm measures emissions to identify process optimizations to reduce emissions and thus costs. In-
sofar as emission reduction ‘is a good proxy’ for the overall efﬁciency of the ﬁrm, this informant suggested that car-
bon reporting was a good way for managers to measure and make transparent their impact on overall company
performance, since reducing environmental impact directly improves the ﬁrm’s bottom line (Gouldson et al.,
2008; Boiral et al., 2012). This comment provides support for the claims of those scholars who have argued that
the level of voluntary climate disclosure will depend on the ﬁrm’s environmental performance (Dawkins and Fraas,
2011), with only those showing big reductions likely to volunteer much information beyond the direct emissions
now required by law under the MCR.
While economic rationales were common, they were not closely tied to the level of disclosure. Some two-thirds of
the 168 ﬁrms in our sample claim in their annual report that there are ﬁnancial beneﬁts to reducing their emissions
and being more energy efﬁcient, but only 73 (43%) were providing the very highest level of detailed data and text
about the breakdown of their emissions by source and scope or their strategies for reducing them. Even when de-
tailed reporting was provided, the savings claimed sometimes amounted to rather less than they might seem at ﬁrst
glance. For example,
Our sustainability initiatives in 2013 have delivered estimated savings of £400,000 in energy costs. The
most effective changes have been achieved through the roll out of energy efﬁcient lighting. This has gener-
ated savings of 1,045 tonnes of CO2e. Lighting remains the biggest source of carbon emissions
(Hammerson, 2014, p. 27).
Such ﬁgures sound impressive until they are compared against a gross rental income for this shopping mall de-
velopment company of £321.2 million. Most of its costs are sunk capital for real estate. Its Scope 1 and 2 emis-
sions from ongoing energy consumption comprise a relatively small part of its cost base, and so the economic
incentives to reduce these emissions – and to report on the reductions – are as not signiﬁcant as they may
appear at ﬁrst glance, while there are no economic incentives to reduce Scope 3 emissions generated farther
up the supply chain.
For many service sector ﬁrms there is limited scope for making energy-related savings. One ﬁnancial service em-
ployee explained how his ﬁrm had little control over its direct emissions:
When you are in a business that is producing relatively modest amounts of emissions anyway there is a lim-
itation in what you can do. The building we occupy, we have no inﬂuence whatsoever on the amount of elec-
tricity that is being consumed as a whole. An outside contractor manages the building. A charge is levied to
every occupant. We have lighting that switches off when there is no movement detected, but I am not sure
what else we can do that has any meaning (Financial Service B, Interview 1).
Since this ﬁrm rents space in an ofﬁce building, it has no control over the major sources of energy usage for heating
and cooling and little incentive to invest in more energy efﬁcient computers or other ofﬁce equipment, because its
energy charges are not levied on the basis of usage. Even if they were, these energy-related operating costs would be
tiny in comparison to remuneration, capital charges, and other expenditure.
Since they had the greatest potential for savings, it is not unsurprising that energy intensive ﬁrms were the most
consistent and enthusiastic in articulating economic rationales for monitoring emissions and reporting. In both its
ecologically modernizing rationale and its rather broad brush lack of detail, the following comment was typical of
the tone adopted by energy intensive ﬁrms in their corporate annual reports:
Energy accounts for over 10% of the mining division’s operating costs, so improving efﬁciency can have sig-
niﬁcant ﬁnancial, as well as environmental beneﬁts (Antofagasta, 2014).
Whilst energy intensive ﬁrms often claim to be making signiﬁcant emission reductions, it is difﬁcult for them
to make absolute reductions, since output and growth are tied so closely to energy consumption (Sullivan,
2008). Accordingly, claims about reductions were often framed in relative terms, such as emissions per unit
output.
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In addition to the potential for direct economic savings through energy efﬁciency, energy intensive ﬁrms often
expressed an interest in carbon reporting because of its close relationship to their liabilities for carbon taxes and
other levies on energy usage, such as the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) and EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS).
We do the CRC, which is mandatory because of our size and energy usage, and also the EU ETS. Reporting
correctly ensures we are taxed appropriately (Energy Utility A, Interview 2).
Whilst reporting is required, ﬁrms noted that it also helped them ensure they are not over-taxed. Other less energy
intensive ﬁrms did not face these pressures and consequently were less consistent in their embrace of economic
rationales for measuring and reporting their emissions. These sectoral differences in the appeal of economic ratio-
nales held regardless of the level of disclosure or whether and when the ﬁrm had signed up to any voluntary
reporting schemes such as the Carbon Disclosure Project or FTSE4good.
A second rationale for carbon reporting was reputational. Even if the direct savings were relatively small, many
ﬁrms were still interested in reporting as a way to curry favour with key stakeholders by demonstrating their
commitment to climate change (Pfeifer and Sullivan, 2008; Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012; Matisoff et al.,
2013). Just over a third (36%) of interviewees explicitly mentioned external pressure from investors, shareholders
or clients as a rationale driving their ﬁrm to report voluntarily or go beyond the minimum reporting require-
ments of the MCR. A representative from one ﬁrm that had taken an early lead in reporting its Scope 3 emis-
sions explained.
Nowadays more and more shareholders, investors and clients are interested in our reporting of carbon emis-
sions and similar climate change issues. They want to know what we are doing and how we are reducing them
(Energy Utility A, Interview 1).
Carbon reporting provided an opportunity for this ﬁrm to show investors that it was doing its bit by making year-
on-year reductions in its contributions to climate change. In addition to their concerns about the ﬁrms’ environ-
mental impacts, stakeholders also use emission data as a proxy for good management (Knox-Hayes and Levy,
2011). This rationale was highlighted by one consultant involved in helping companies to organize their carbon
reporting:
Stakeholders understand that the more carbon there is in the atmosphere the worst it will be. So it is very easy
to compare emissions data and progress against one another (Consultant D).
We identiﬁed several distinct ways in which ﬁrms perceive carbon reporting as part of a more general process of
impression management. Some ﬁrms participate in various voluntary carbon reporting schemes to ‘distinguish
themselves from competitors and gain recognition’ (Matisoff et al., 2013, p. 297). For instance, one interviewee
highlighted the potential importance of their voluntary participation in CDP’s Climate Change Program for investor
decision-making:
It is important that we put out to the investor community the work we are doing. It might form part of their
tick box criteria if we have CDP. They might put a tick against our name and so on (Water E, Interview 1).
CDP publishes emission performance tables that rank ﬁrms both generally and by sector. These league tables are
made available to potential investors to inform their decisions about where to invest (Knox-Hayes and Levy, 2011).
This creates a competitive environment where ﬁrms aim to outperform their peers to gain kudos and ultimately at-
tract new investment, as this informant explained:
CDP is an opportunity to show our investors what and how we are tackling climate change. CDP is a good plat-
form because it allows for benchmarking. We are doing very well in our sector. We are leaders (Financial Ser-
vice E, Interview 1).
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Topping the league tables is a powerful way for ﬁrms – and their senior staff – to differentiate themselves in a
crowded ﬁeld.
Other ﬁrms carry out carbon reporting for defensive reasons of reputation management. Firms are sensitive
about potential damage to their ‘brand’ (Eccles and DiPiazza, 2002) and hope that reporting will not only demon-
strate their effectiveness in tackling climate change, but also build more general conﬁdence that management
‘knows what they are doing’ (Kolk and Pinkse, 2004; Hoffman, 2005). One informant explained how reporting
can provide a way to contextualize facts and ﬁgures that might otherwise look bad if left unexplained:
Carbon reporting allows you to explain why emissions have gone up. If you take the 2012 winter, it was very
wet. We had an awful lot of inﬁltration of surface water into our sewers. We had to pump an awful lot of ad-
ditional water that correlated with an increase in energy consumption and emissions. We used the data to ex-
plain this was what was going on inside the business before people started asking about why our total
emissions had gone up and why their water bills had increased (Water C, Interview 2).
While this kind of defensively motivated reporting resembles greenwashing behaviour, others explain that their
reporting is simply about matching peer activity rather than for any substantive purpose:
If our peers are doing it then it’s likely that we will do it. You’re always horizon scanning about what other
ﬁrms are doing (Financial Service C, Interview 1).
This purely mimetic rationale was offered by interviewees from seven ﬁrms (both energy and non-energy-intensive),
who all explained that the decision to report was driven by the desire to keep up with competitors. Similar to the
study by Stanny and Ely (2008) of US ﬁrms, fears of being perceived as a bad corporate citizen or having something
to hide were strong incentives for our case study ﬁrms to continue reporting even when they perceived no practical
value in doing so. This herding instinct was defensive in its motives and reﬂected concerns about the reputational
risks of going it alone.
The other big six energy ﬁrms in the UK take part [in CDP’s Climate Change Program], so again it would seem
strange or wrong to not take part. It would have looked strange if we were the only ones not involved (Energy
Utility C, Interview 2).
Participation at least ensures they are matching the basic activities of peers, and thereby avoiding the poten-
tial risk of departing from the norm. Likewise, in his study of how climate change is treated rhetorically in
the non-ﬁnancial reports of the world’s 30 largest corporations, Ihlen (2009) found that, regardless of their
environmental record, ﬁrms echo the same rhetoric and ideals as their competitors. While this kind of mi-
metically motivated reporting may increase corporate engagement with climate change, it does not guarantee
that a ﬁrm takes the same actions as their peers. Indeed, Ihlen (2009) suggests that it may instead mask
negative performance, because stakeholders assume ﬁrms are acting in the same way due to similarities
in reporting.
A third major driver of carbon reporting is regulatory. Long before the MCR came into force in 2013, many ﬁrms
were subject to other carbon reporting requirements, such as EU ETS and CRC. The conventional business re-
sponse to these is to regard compliance as a minimum level of achievement (Jones and Levy, 2007; Kauffmann
et al., 2012). Over 60% of our informants explained that carbon reporting occurs because their ﬁrm is legally obli-
gated to do it. Asked to explain why they report, one informant simply replied:
First thing, we have to. We are mandated to report on our carbon emissions (Financial Service D, Interview 1).
Reporting protects a ﬁrm from ﬁnancial penalties and carbon taxes as well as from any negative publicity that may
arise from failing to comply (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Eberlein and Matten, 2009). Indeed, when asked
about the potential consequences of non-compliance, interviewees, almost to a person, insisted that they would
do what was necessary to avoid the ﬁnancial and reputational risks of non-compliance:
444 S. Tang and D. Demeritt
© 2017 The Authors. Business Strategy and the Environment published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd Bus. Strat. Env. 27, 437–455 (2018)
DOI: 10.1002/bse
EU ETS has to be reported to the required standards. Have appropriate veriﬁcation in place and all that
sort of thing. We do that because it is a legal requirement. We have to comply with these schemes, like
any other legally required ﬁrm, because it can be very costly if we fail to do them correctly (Extractive C,
Interview 1).
Stiff penalties, reputational as much as ﬁnancial, for failing to do it right mean that ﬁrms treat reporting as just one
of those things they have to do. Reporting is a normative duty of responsible corporate citizenship. Nevertheless, our
review of 168 company reports found six (5%) failing to meet all of the reporting requirements under the new MCR
two years after it came into force.
While decisions to go beyond minimum regulatory disclosure requirements were typically driven by economic or
reputational considerations, a few ﬁrms described how carbon reporting helped them manage other regulatory de-
mands (Andrew and Cortese, 2011). Emission data is used by economically regulated ﬁrms in bids to the regulator:
The results of annual and interim carbon reporting are used to track progress of schemes designed to reduce
our energy use and emissions. They are also used to make cases [to the regulator] for new energy and carbon
saving projects that will require additional ﬁnancial support. We publish reports on the website so that cus-
tomers, suppliers, students, and governing bodies have access (Water B, Interview 2).
Emission data can also help economically regulated ﬁrms such as this to justify price increases to fund new capital
investments needed to reduce emissions and yield other social beneﬁts. Carbon reporting was also used by econom-
ically regulated ﬁrms to defend against criticism and avoid blame for price increases by pointing to the environmen-
tal improvements those price rises are buying (cf. Hood, 2002). Energy utility ﬁrms in particular are under intense
pressure to explain why falling wholesale energy costs are not being passed on to consumers, who have experienced
rising energy bills for the last decade. Interviewees from two of four case study energy utilities explained that they
have used government climate policy and mandatory schemes as reasons to justify price rises:
We communicate that energy prices are going up because we have to do this green obligation stuff that the
Government signed up to (Energy Utility B, Interview 2).
Firms claim that climate policy and schemes impact operational costs to such an extent that these costs need to be
reﬂected in bills. Carbon reporting is used as a tool to communicate that energy prices are heavily inﬂuenced by con-
ditions that are out of the ﬁrm’s hands.
Another beneﬁt of complying with reporting schemes is the potential to deﬂect the implementation of more
stringent regulations (Sullivan, 2008; Eberlein and Matten, 2009). Some ﬁrms see reporting as a means of en-
gaging with regulators about the shape of future regulation. Some interviewees went as far to say that their ﬁrm
works with regulators to establish a clear and stable regulatory framework that is economically efﬁcient to re-
spond to.
We engage regulators to make sure that the regulations for reporting make sense, so it’s not an unjust burden
and so forth (Extractive C, Interview 1).
This suggests that carbon reporting is strategically performed by some ﬁrms to avoid shocks and maintain some
degree of control on their future reporting obligations.
Impacts of Reporting on Business Process and Internal Organization
The practice of carbon reporting has had a number of impacts on the internal organization of UK corporations.
First, compiling emission data in the required formats for reporting has pushed ﬁrms to tighten internal coordina-
tion and establish new reporting lines, as this informant explained:
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There are beneﬁts in terms of being able to work more ctlosely with the ﬁnancial department. They have to
engage more with the sustainability team, which is good for us (Financial Service E, Interview 1).
Carbon reporting was relatively new to this informant’s ﬁrm, which was still ﬁnding its way. By contrast, respon-
dents from the water and energy utilities saw statutory reporting requirements as less transformative because they
had long been required by their economic regulators, Ofwat and Ofgem, to include emission data as part of their
bids for price increases to support capital investment in energy efﬁciency.
I don’t think it [the MCR] will change anything drastically for us. We already report to Ofwat our GHG emis-
sions annually and that is based on the Defra methodology, which is similar to the carbon mandate guidance
(Water A, Interview 2).
All 19 of our case study ﬁrms now collect data on Scope 1 and 2 emissions as deﬁned by the Greenhouse Gas
Protocol. A smaller number (nine) collect some data on Scope 3 emissions, typically associated with ﬂights and
business travel, which are relatively easy to collect compared with the full life cycle analysis that might be required
to trace the emissions arising up and down the supply chain. Since these indirect Scope 3 emissions incur no cost
to the ﬁrm, the rationale for collecting them was invariably reputational and tied to participation in voluntary
reporting schemes such as CDP’s Climate Change Program that score ﬁrms more favourably if this additional in-
formation is reported.
While there are now well established accounting protocols for reporting these different types of GHG emission,
there were important differences in the way that different ﬁrms organized themselves in order to do their reporting.
In energy intensive ﬁrms, operational units are often responsible for collecting data about their own emissions. Au-
tonomy is important because the technical complexities of different operations mean that only these units know
what is happening locally.
Quantitative emission data comes from reﬁning, exploration, and production because they generate emis-
sions. They know how and why. This is fed through an established process to be reported and managed at
group level (Extractive A, Interview 2).
In this set-up responsibility for data collection is devolved to the various operational units, which submit emission
data to an internal database. This is then accessed by the central reporting unit, typically located in a corporate sus-
tainability or management accounting department, which then accesses them in order to monitor performance, col-
late information in accordance with whatever scheme the ﬁrm is responding to, and check for commercial sensitivity.
Greater technical expertise in energy intensive ﬁrms, combined with larger and potentially more embarrassing
emission proﬁles, meant that these ﬁrms were more likely to adopt their own bespoke metrics for reporting their
emissions. Thus, instead of reporting their emissions in terms of kilotonnes (ktCO2e) or million tonnes (mtCO2e)
of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions, the coal-ﬁred Drax power station reported its 2012 emissions in terms of
CO2 emissions per unit of output, whereas the electricity generator E.ON, one of the so-called ‘big six’ energy pro-
viders in the UK, reported its 2012 emissions in terms of carbon intensity in metric tons of CO2 per megawatt hours
(MW h) of electricity generated.
By contrast, less energy intensive ﬁrms tended to organize their reporting differently. Typically the central
reporting team took lead responsibility for collecting as well as collating and externally reporting emission data:
We have a project manager who collects data and information from everywhere. We use a materiality matrix
process to decide what we should be reporting on. This is made up of information taken from reporting frame-
works. Data collection is performed, and we then put that together and report outwards (Financial Service A,
Interview 1).
Non-energy-intensive ﬁrms were also much less likely to depart from standard reporting metrics such as ktCO2e/
year. Of the 62 non-energy-intensive ﬁrms in our sample disclosing their emissions publicly, only Talk Talk Group
(2013) used alternative metrics: in its case tonnes of CO2 equivalent per Gigabit.
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A second major impact of carbon reporting has been to raise the proﬁle of GHG emissions and climate change
more generally within ﬁrms (González-Benito and González-Benito, 2006; Hahn and Kühnen, 2013). Whereas
company directors did not routinely review the emission data reported through voluntary schemes such as the Car-
bon Disclosure Project, board-level sign-off is now required under the UK Government’s new MCR since emission
data must be included as part of the annual directors’ report. As a result, the board now signs off on these manda-
tory emissions reports, in a way that had not always been true for ﬁrms that had previously been participating in
voluntary reporting schemes. Informants from less energy intensive sectors in particular emphasized how board-
level sign-off had signiﬁcantly increased the proﬁle of carbon emissions within their ﬁrms:
The statutes have meant sustainability and addressing carbon have become more signiﬁcant in the managers’
agenda. More people are taking it seriously throughout the business (Financial Service E, Interview 1).
These comments about the importance of board-level sign-off in driving awareness and in carbon emissions were
echoed in responses to the 2016 government consultation on reforming the business energy tax efﬁciency landscape
(HM Treasury, 2016, 2.6). Heightened awareness, in turn, provided a reason for those charged with reporting to
approach and consult operational units that had previously been unconcerned with social and environmental im-
pacts, reinforcing the internal coordination impacts of carbon reporting. In this way greater awareness and closer
coordination are mutually reinforcing.
As awareness has grown, ﬁrms have also become more selective about their participation in voluntary indexes.
We no longer do Dow Jones Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good, or Corporate Responsibility Index. We only do
CDP’s Climate Change Program and undertake the Carbon Trust Standard. A decision was made to only par-
ticipate in indices we thought were right for the business (Water D, Interview 1).
Unless there is a positive impact or it mitigates risks, voluntary reporting is perceived to be ‘“nice to do”, but not a
“must do” for those that can “ﬂy under the radar”’ (Stubbs et al., 2013, p. 466).
There are important sectoral differences in the awareness impacts of the new statutory reporting requirements.
Informants from energy intensive and economically regulated ﬁrms were less likely to see the new statutory carbon
requirements as particularly inﬂuential, insofar as ﬁnancial and regulatory drivers meant that they were already ac-
counting for their emissions:
It [the MCR] doesn’t look like there is anything in there that we don’t do already (Extractive A, Interview 1).
Consequently for these ﬁrms the new requirements did relatively little to raise awareness of the importance of cli-
mate change.
By contrast, informants from less energy intensive sectors saw the statutory reporting requirements as more in-
ﬂuential in raising the proﬁle of emissions within their ﬁrms, but also more burdensome. As one ﬁnancial services
informant explained,
More savings can be made from re-negotiating your energy supply than actually reducing energy (Financial
Service C, Interview 1).
Without strong ﬁnancial or regulatory incentives to reduce their emissions, statutory disclosure requirements were
crucial in overcoming the general indifference of the ﬁnancial services and telecommunication ﬁrms within our
case study sample to doing anything signiﬁcant about emissions, which were otherwise regarded as insigniﬁcant
to company performance.
Third, a few ﬁrms have responded to the increased saliency of carbon emissions by explicitly incorporating emis-
sion reductions targets into their remuneration strategies:
We’ve got incentives where if we perform well environmentally, where we can prove we are reporting well on
our emissions, then we are going to get some cash beneﬁts from it (Energy Utility A, Interview 3).
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Similar remuneration schemes were reported by interviewees from eight different ﬁrms. Employees – on either an
individual, team, or entire operational unit basis – are rewarded with bonuses and/or base pay rises if speciﬁed
emission reduction targets are met or the ﬁrm performs well in voluntary indexes. Such incentivization strategies
raise interesting questions about the internal negotiations concerning what the data is actually saying, what it could
say, and how to best present the data publicly to maintain business growth (Nyberg and Wright, 2012). To overcome
concerns about potentially cooking the numbers, many ﬁrms looked to third party assurance ‘to ensure the credibil-
ity of our data’ (Standard Chartered, 2014, p. 28). Those involved in third party assurance typically described it in
terms of enhancing external credibility:
Assurance helps try and combat the stakeholders’ opinion that the ﬁrm is trying to greenwash (Consultant B,
Interview 1).
However, with remuneration increasingly tied to emission targets, assurance was also understood by informants
as part of normal internal audit and corporate control processes. Arguably, this normalization of auditing emis-
sions weakens the pressure that can be exerted by external stakeholders to change behaviour (Sullivan and
Gouldson, 2017).
Impacts of Reporting on Business Performance and the External Environment
It was very common in both annual reports and interviews to claim that the practice of carbon reporting (e.g. mea-
sure, monitor, manage) had helped improve both the environmental and economic performance of participating
ﬁrms. The following comment is typical of the sort of generalized claim made in annual reports:
We monitor our electricity usage, carbon emission levels and use of renewable energy. Most of our larger op-
erations have high levels of electricity self-sufﬁciency. We focus on improving the energy efﬁciency of our op-
erations and have invested in our operations to improve our energy proﬁle and increase electricity self-
sufﬁciency, while reducing ongoing operating costs and carbon emission levels (Mondi Group, 2015, p. 41).
Similar sentiments were expressed by two-thirds of interviewees. They credited carbon reporting with improving
business performance:
The results of annual and interim carbon and sustainability reporting are used to track progress of schemes
designed to reduce our energy use and carbon emissions (Water B, Interview 2).
Although efﬁciency gains were one common rationale for reporting, only a few interviewees could point to tangible
measures undertaken by their ﬁrms in response to the emission data they were collecting. The speciﬁcity of this in-
formant about the impacts of reporting on business performance was unusual:
Carbon reporting has been positive …. It has led to us developing a ﬁve-year 17% energy reduction target
across all of our sites (Extractive A, Interview 1).
For this company, the capability of quantifying their emissions through carbon reporting allows them to actively
govern and manage their emissions (Caritte et al., 2015).
Outside the energy intensive sectors, informants often struggled to get beyond the platitudinous. This is partly
because for these ﬁrms reporting is more about legitimacy-seeking than actually driving environmental perfor-
mance and proﬁtability. As one ﬁnancial services informant explained,
Energy reduction is more about having the targets to talk about externally than any internal cost-savings
(Financial Service C, Interview 1).
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Such comments raise important questions about the efﬁcacy of reporting in driving emission reductions as
envisioned by advocates of ecological modernization (Hajer, 1995).
Such concerns are reinforced by quantitative analysis of the emissions reported in annual reports. Figure 1 plots
the ratio of carbon equivalent emissions reported in 2015 against those reported in 2014. 139 ﬁrms in our sample
provide complete and comparable data in the ﬁrst two years after the introduction of the new statutory MCR. While
more ﬁrms (63%) report emission reductions than increases, the mean year-on-year change across all 139 ﬁrms is
substantially skewed by seven ﬁrms reporting increases of more than 25%. Apart from a handful of ﬁrms at either
extreme, most ﬁrms (72%) reported modest changes in their emission proﬁles of less than 10% either positive or
negative.
While most sectors were split fairly evenly between ﬁrms reporting increases and decreases, there was a tendency
for ﬁrms in the energy intensive utilities sector and in the consumer goods and consumer services sectors to report
emission reductions, though there were also some ﬁrms in these sectors reporting increases, so it is difﬁcult to tell if
these represent secular changes in the sector or broader economy or ﬁrm-level variation. The high standard devia-
tions in emission performance among ﬁrms in the healthcare and ﬁnancial services industries, as well as in the
more energy intensive industrials and extractive, oil & gas and basic materials sectors, suggest the importance of
ﬁrm-level factors, rather than sectoral shifts, as the key determinant of performance.
Management studies scholars have offered a number of competing hypotheses to explain these uneven patterns
of performance. On the one hand, scholars have often theorized that voluntary reporting is more likely from ﬁrms
with a good story to tell about their success in reducing emissions (Clarkson et al., 2008; Rankin et al., 2011). Alter-
natively others have emphasized the pressure on ‘dirty’ industries to secure their societal licence to operate through
legitimacy-seeking disclosure and transparency (Fung et al., 2007; Pellegrino and Lodhia, 2012). From either per-
spective we might expect to see a difference in the emission reductions reported by early voluntary reporters as
against the laggards only reporting for the ﬁrst time under the MCR. To test for this and any interactions between
sector and early versus late reporting, we conducted a two-way ANOVA (F(2, 120) = 0.161, p = 0.990) but found no
statistically signiﬁcant interactions between sector and early reporting and no meaningful differences in the year-on-
Figure 1. Percentage change in GHG emissions from 2014 to 2015, all MCR compliant ﬁrms
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year emission reduction performance between those ﬁrms that had reported voluntarily before the MCR came into
force and those that only disclosed their emissions after 2013 when compelled to do so by the MCR.
Caution is required in drawing ﬁrm conclusions about the efﬁcacy of reporting on ﬁrm performance from just
two years of data. As one of our informants explained,
The problem I have with all of the carbon reporting is it is a set of ﬁgures which are actually meaningless in
isolation. If you look at our target performance over the last ten years at the beginning we made a lot more
progress than we do now. If someone picks up our report last year then they would think we have done noth-
ing (Financial Service D, Interview 1).
To explore this possibility, Figure 2 plots the rate of short-term emission change from 2014 to 2015 (x-axis)
against the rate of emission change over the longer term of 2012 to 2015 (y-axis) for 119 ﬁrms in our sample making
consistent and comparable emission data available in their annual reports. Like 10% of the ﬁrms for which data is
available, Financial Service Firm D fell into Quadrant IV, with 2015 emissions increasing in the short term from
2014 levels but still lower than in 2012. Most ﬁrms (76.4%) were more consistent in their performance over both
the short and longer term, falling either into Quadrant I for those with consistently increasing emissions or Quad-
rant III for those with consistently decreasing emissions. Amongst those with decreasing emissions there is evi-
dence of diminishing returns, with the rate of decrease slowing. But 10.1% of ﬁrms fell into Quadrant IV with
recent increases in emissions relative to the 2014 baseline suggesting that the longer-term declines relative to the
Figure 2. 2015 GHG emissions as a percentage of 2014 emissions (x-axis) versus those as a percentage of 2012 emissions (y-axis), 119 early
reporting ﬁrms. N.B. scatterplot excludes one outlier from the industrials sector at 1402%, 889%
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2012 baseline may have been driven by secular impacts of the Great Recession and anaemic growth in the UK econ-
omy 2010–12 rather than concerted efforts at improving environmental performance.
At the sectoral level energy intensive utilities showed the most consistent emission declines. However, the pat-
tern of performance in other sectors was much less clear and one-way ANOVA showed no statistically signiﬁcant
differences among sectors in longer-term emission reduction.
Discussion
Carbon reporting was commonplace among leading UK corporations before the government imposed mandatory
carbon reporting. Our research has shown that companies engaged in the practice for a number of different rea-
sons, including ﬁnancial gain, reputational considerations, and regulatory compulsion. The prospect of savings typ-
ically loomed larger for energy intensive ﬁrms than for non-energy-intensive ones, which were more commonly
driven to report by social pressure and the desire to manage their reputation. Regulatory considerations were a more
important rationale for ﬁrms and sectors that were economically regulated than for those that were not.
There were also sectoral differences in the impact of reporting on internal business processes, albeit not as stark
as those in reporting rationales. The scale and complexity of their emission proﬁles led energy intensive ﬁrms to
grant operational units more autonomy in reporting than non-energy-intensive ﬁrms, where data collection and
reporting were more typically coordinated by a central reporting unit. The role of mandatory reporting in raising
awareness of carbon emissions also differed. In energy intensive and economically regulated sectors, carbon emis-
sions have long been board-level concerns, because of the costs of energy consumption and the saliency of climate
change in regulatory ﬁlings and in bids to the regulator for price increases. By contrast, informants in less energy
intensive ﬁrms and in sectors not subject to price-setting economic regulators often reported that the new statutory
requirement that carbon reporting be incorporated in the annual reports signed off by the board had raised the pro-
ﬁle of the issue in their ﬁrms. A number of ﬁrms are now incorporating emission reduction into their remuneration
strategies.
However, despite these important sectoral differences in the rationales for carbon reporting and its internal im-
pacts on business organization, we found no clear sectoral patterns in the impacts of reporting on business perfor-
mance and the external environment. Indeed, we found limited evidence for the efﬁcacy of carbon reporting in
consistently driving emission reductions. Some ﬁrms were able to reduce their emissions year on year, while others
increased them, but there were no consistent patterns across the ﬁrms for which comparable data are publicly available.
Nevertheless, our comparative analysis does suggest several key drivers shaping corporate motives for and in-
ternal responses to carbon reporting (cf. Eleftheriadis and Anagnostopoulou 2014). In particular, our analysis
highlights the importance of both energy intensity and the regulatory status of ﬁrms in determining the impor-
tance of emission reduction to the bottom line and thereby shaping their motives for and organizational re-
sponses to carbon reporting. Whereas energy intensity creates ﬁnancial incentives to use reporting to drive
emission reduction, the presence of economic regulation and the importance of climate change to that regulator
increases reporting compliance and the utility of those reports for actual emission reduction. Based on these two
variables we can create a 2 × 2 table to predict the response of ﬁrms to new carbon reporting requirements
(Table 3).
Energy intensive and economically regulated ﬁrms, at the bottom right of Table 3, face mutually reinforcing eco-
nomic and regulatory incentives to report in full and use this information to reduce emissions, both to increase the
bottom line and to curry favour with the regulator. Our energy and water utility case study sectors both fell into this
category. Thus we would also expect the energy intensive and economically regulated rail sector to be subject to sim-
ilar dynamics and to respond in the way that the water and energy utilities have. Although civilian aviation is not
subject to price-setting, airport capacity is closely regulated and we might expect it to be similar. Their reliance on
fuel to operate and high emission contribution, as well as their regulatory status and public-facing nature, mean that
carbon reporting is an avenue for them to manage their stakeholder relationships by reducing the potential negativ-
ity over changing costs in their service and emission increases from business growth.
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For energy intensive but non-economically-regulated ﬁrms, at the upper right of Table 3, we would predict that
strong economic incentives will drive emission reduction, but without the need for regulatory ﬁlings the degree
of disclosure will depend on competitiveness concerns. Our extractives case study sector fell into this category, thus
we would expect other energy intensive industrial sectors, such as basic materials and industrials, to be subject to
similar dynamics, whereby reporting is about win–win outcomes such as identifying economic savings by reducing
their large energy consumption and carbon taxes. Once achieved, ﬁrms may then use reporting to create some mar-
ket differentiation that highlights the strength of their emission performance and scope of actions.
For non-energy-intensive and non-economically-regulated ﬁrms, at the upper left of Table 3, we would predict
that carbon reporting will be chieﬂy driven by reputational considerations, since there are few opportunities for ﬁ-
nancial savings from reducing energy and emissions, and because of their public-facing nature. Reporting provides
market differentiation opportunities to gain new business by outperforming competitors in voluntary reporting in-
dexes and undertaking novel or sector leader practice. Therefore, decisions to report and act are likely to be inﬂu-
enced by the scope of reputational gains they return. Our ﬁnancial services case study sector fell into this
category, thus we would expect other consumer-facing industrial sectors such as consumer goods, consumer ser-
vices and healthcare to be subject to similar dynamics.
For non-energy-intensive and economically regulated ﬁrms, at the bottom left of Table 3, we would predict that
carbon reporting is about being auditable to their stakeholders. Although they cannot make big ﬁnancial savings
from reducing energy and emissions, reporting can be an important tool to manage their relationship with the reg-
ulator, who can restrict their business growth if they do nothing. Though none of our case study sectors fell into this
category, we would expect telecommunication ﬁrms, which are non-energy-intensive but economically regulated, to
follow this behaviour. Reducing energy and emissions is not likely to yield signiﬁcant ﬁnancial beneﬁts, but carbon
reporting to performative standards will help manage relationships with the regulator, who has a more signiﬁcant
impact on performance.
Whilst the typology provides a useful classiﬁcation of corporate carbon responses, it overlooks how speciﬁc re-
sources and capabilities of a ﬁrm also drive business strategy and performance alongside the more general
sectoral-level characteristics identiﬁed in this study (e.g. energy intensity, economic regulation). Firm speciﬁc char-
acteristics empirically identiﬁed as causing variability in environmental strategy (González-Benito and González-
Benito, 2006; Hahn and Kühnen, 2013; Muttakin et al., 2015) and climate change strategy (Wahyuni and
Ratnatunga, 2015; Amran et al., 2016) include corporate size, internationalization, ﬁnancial performance (e.g. liquid-
ity or proﬁtability), managerial attitude, managerial international experience, strategic direction and attitude, owner-
ship structure, board diversity, and position in the value chain, among others. For example, ﬁrms with a positive
managerial attitude that is supportive, committed and knowledgeable are likelier to take action and disclose informa-
tion because managerial endorsement increases access to essential resources necessary for implementation (e.g.
Non-energy intensive Energy intensive
Non-Economically regulated Performative legitimacy seeking
Reporting shaped by reputational concerns and
liable to be de-coupled from actual practice
without strong brand differentiation or
consumer pressure for emission reduction.
Competitive eco-modernism
Strong ﬁnancial pressures to reduce emission,
but degree of disclosure will depend
on reputational concerns.
Economically regulated Compliant legitimacy-seeking
With little direct ﬁnancial incentive to reduce
emissions, reporting shaped by reputational
concerns and opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage, which will determine the degree to
which reporting is closely coupled to effective
mitigation action.
Compliant efﬁciency-seeking
Mutually reinforcing economic and regulatory
incentives to couple detailed reporting to
substantial emission reduction.
Table 3. Sectoral characteristics shaping carbon rationales and responses
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ﬁnance, technology) and/or the extent of cross-organizational engagement and collaboration. Given managerial atti-
tude’s impact on environmental and climate change strategies, it is probable that this (and other characteristics) will
also affect the four broad categories of carbon reporting response. That is, ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics will cause var-
iability between the carbon reporting responses of ﬁrms classiﬁed in the same category.
Conclusion
Getting ﬁrms to participate in carbon reporting is often assumed to lead to an enhanced application of climate mit-
igation measures. This assumption is based on an argument that behavioural change will occur because reporting
will encourage ﬁrms to develop a deeper understanding of an issue or topic, while being forced to disclose their per-
formance publicly will incentivize them to take steps to improve that performance. This study found that the inﬂu-
ence of carbon reporting varies by sector and depends on key variables such as energy intensity and regulatory
status. In the case of carbon reporting, CSR requirements designed to nudge ﬁrms into action have had important
impacts on ﬁrms, but more on their internal operation and outward face than on the external environment itself.
Arguably those internal changes are preconditions for substantial shifts in the environmental impacts of business,
but the case of carbon reporting suggests reasons for caution about the enthusiasm sometimes invested in CSR. We
found some evidence of reporting to report and greenwashing, as well as of ecological modernizing, but overall the
impacts of carbon reporting seem modest.
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